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of Homogeneity and Expected Loss of Monetary Independence 
By 
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University of Sunderland in London 
Abstract 
The West African Monetary Zone formally came into existence in 2000. Currently the 
monetary zone has six members: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. The objective of the WAMZ is to establish a monetary union characterised by a 
common central bank and a single currency (the eco), to replace the existing national currencies 
of members.The focus of this paper is to assess monetary reactions across the WAMZ and 
determine if these monetary reactions are closely similar across the proposed monetary zone. 
Further to this, the degree of monetary independence loss by five member countries of the 
WAMZ in the event of the take-off of the proposed monetary integration are also evaluated. 
The theoretical foundation of this paper is the general monetary theory postulation that a dual 
relationship exists between actions regarding monetary policy actions and how some variables 
(real/nominal) develop. Monetary policy impacts real and nominal variables (at least in the 
short run), the monetary policy actions in themselves are however subject to prior realisation 
of the particular variable. Monetary policy reaction functions are estimated to account for that 
relationship. The response of policy instrument to movements in fundamental macroeconomic 
variables of inflation and output gap is simply the reaction function. This paper models the 
monetary policies of the WAMZ member countries in line with the hybrid McCallum-Taylor 
Rule (HMTR) which is a modification of the popular Taylor Rule. This HMTR reaction 
function expresses the money supply growth rate as a function of the output gap growth and 
inflation gap growth. Since it is not automatic for a country joining a monetary union to lose 
its monetary autonomy given the principle that a country can only lose what it has. Therefore, 
the WAMZ countries making up the proposed monetary union can only lose monetary 
autonomy only if they actually have such autonomy, away from the influence of the anchor 
country’s (Nigeria) monetary policy or rather if their respective monetary policy is independent 
of the anchor country’s (Nigeria) policy. Countries joining a monetary union are therefore 
expected to incur economic cost of formally adopting a common monetary policy by joining 
the full monetary union. This hypothesis is tested in the second aspect of this paper with the 
application of a simple McCallum monetary base related model, augmented with Nigerian 
policy variable to determine the degree of monetary policy independence loss by the five 
WAMZ countries that would eventually abandon their respective countries' currencies and join 
the proposed monetary union. Annual data of nominal GDP, inflation rate, money supply, and 
commodity price index for the WAMZ countries were applied in these assessments. These data 
cover the period 1980 to 2014. The Hodrick-Prescot method was applied to filter the potential 
(trend) from the actual data. The monetary reaction homogeneity assessments have evidence 
to suggest that all things being equal and if past behaviour of the macroeconomic variables 
evaluated for the WAMZ countries are factors of significance, a single monetary policy may 
not be suitable for the future monetary zone. The main proof here are the diverse forms of 
reactions of the monetary policy instrument to inflation and output. Evidence from the 
evaluation of the extent of expected loss of monetary independence by the WAMZ countries 
indicate that the degree of loss of monetary independence would be high in The Gambia and 
Liberia, the extent of this loss would be low in the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone.  
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1.1 Introduction 
The Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS)  has a long term objective of 
establishing an economic and monetary union between all member countries.When 
ECOWAS revised its Treaty in 1993, the crucial aim was to accelerate the economic 
integration process and strengthen political cooperation. The revised objectives heralded the 
formation  of a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) which 
formally came into existence on 15 December, 2000 when five prospective member countries 
(The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) signed the Articles of Agreement of 
the zone. This Accra Declaration established the WAMZ. At ECOWAS, the thinking was that 
the successful launch of the WAMZ would aid the merger with the CFA zone and that this 
would usher-in the ECOWAS single currency, the eco. The establishment of a monetary 
union characterised by a common central bank and a single currency (the eco) which is to 
replace the existing five national currencies is the main objective of the WAMZ which was 
initially scheduled to take-off in January 2003. Liberia later joined the WAMZ. 
A mid-term convergence assessment in 2002 revealed that despite some achievements by 
WAMZ member countries, these were not adequate enough support the take-off of the 
monetary union in January 2003. A major problem was the inadequate commitment of member 
countries of WAMZ to support their commitment expressed with actions. This consequently 
led to the extension of the WAMZ programme to 30 June, 2005 so that the common central 
bank and the common currency would take off on 1 July 2005. Another deadline of 31 
December, 2009 was set so that the single currency and the common central bank would be 
effective from 1 January 2010. Due to same reasons this could not be met. The official reason 
for this action was stated as "the global economic and financial crisis which has put constraints 
on member state's ability to meet the convergence criteria individually and collectively". The 
last agreed take off date of 1 January 2015 actually became unrealistic thus bringing about 
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heavy cloud over the take-off of the monetary union.1 It is necessary to state that as at date, the 
WAMZ has no definite take-off date.  
Similarities of macroeconomic fundamental are key in a currency area serve as huge 
determinant of the cost of surrendering monetary policy autonomy by these involved in 
monetary integration. With similarities in macroeconomic and monetary fundamentals, there 
would be no necessity for individual economic policy responses in addressing 
macroeconomic and monetary shocks across member countries. What this entails is that 
monetary factor symmetries would cause a single monetary policy for a currency area to 
suffice. Contrarily, when monetary fundamentals are asymmetric, individual monetary and 
economic policies are necessary in dealing with the monetary and economic disturbances. 
Therefore, the higher the degree of homogeneity of monetary reactions the better the 
countries involved in a monetary integration are suited as a monetary union characterised by 
a single monetary policy. 
Consequent upon the above, this paper aims at examining monetary reactions in the West 
African Monetary Zone, their similarities among member countries as well as the degree of 
expected loss of monetary independence by these countries on the eventual take-off of the 
proposed monetary integration. A research question to answer is if there are similarities 
among the reactions of monetary policy instruments (money supply growth) in reaction to 
economic fundamentals in the WAMZ. Results generated from this paper have information 
for the design of a future common monetary policy for the proposed monetary union. The 
investigation into the expected loss (indirectly to Nigeria, a possible lead country) of 
monetary independence will provide answers to the research question pertaining to the level 
                                                          
1
 From all indications, the WAMZ member countries found it difficult to meet the convergence criteria. 
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of monetary independence that would be conceded by the other five WAMZ countries to 
Nigeria, given the ‘domineering’ big economic size of Nigeria within the monetary zone.   
1.2 Theoretical Background: 
A general monetary theory postulation is that a dual relationship exists between actions 
regarding monetary policy actions and how some variables (real/nominal) develop. Although, 
monetary policy impacts real and nominal variables (at least in the short run), the monetary 
policy actions in themselves are however subject to prior realisation of the particular variable. 
Monetary policy reaction functions are estimated to account for that relationship. The 
response of policy instrument to movements in fundamental macroeconomic variables of 
inflation and output gap is simply the reaction function. As a simple policy rule, the Taylor 
Rule reflects the reaction of short term interest rate to the deviations of inflation from its 
targets as well as the deviations’ of output from its potentials. The (TR) is thus a monetary 
policy reaction function in which the policy interest rate reacts to shocks to inflation and also 
to shocks to output gap. By the implications of the reaction function, the Hybrid McCallum 
Taylor Rule (HMTR) reaction function applied in this paper expresses the money supply 
growth rate a function of the output gap growth and inflation gap growth. Whenever the rate 
at which output exceeds its potential is rising, this signals inflationary pressures and 
consequently, the monetary authority should reduce the rate of money supply growth in order 
to accommodate such pressure. Similarly, when inflation rates at which inflation rate deviates 
from its desire rate is fast, the policymaker should reduce money supply growth rate. The 
degree of homogeneity in monetary reactions of member countries of a monetary union 
reveals the degree of similarity of the aggregated shocks hitting these individual economies. 
In assessing the homogeneity of monetary policies of the WAMZ countries, it is therefore 
necessary to estimate monetary reaction function equations for these countries since there are 
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tendencies that the zone’s future monetary policy may deviate from rules when aiming at 
accommodate goals other than price stability and economic growth.  
It is not automatic for a country joining a monetary union to lose its monetary autonomy 
whenever it is involved in monetary cooperation and integration. The simple principle is that 
a country cannot lose what it does not have, or rather a country can only lose what it has. And 
so, the WAMZ countries making up the proposed monetary union can only lose monetary 
autonomy only if they actually have such autonomy, away from the influence of the anchor 
country’s (Nigeria) monetary policy or rather if their respective monetary policy is 
independent of the anchor country’s (Nigeria) policy.2   
During the pre-EMU formation period, there were views that when a country abandons its 
own national currency (for a common currency), there would be a loss of a policy 
instrument.3 Countries joining a monetary union are expected to incur economic cost of 
formally adopting a common monetary policy by joining the full monetary union. In this 
research study, this hypothesis is interestingly tested in the context of the WAMZ countries 
and the dominance of Nigeria within the monetary zone. For the WAMZ’s five smaller 
economies, a simple McCallum monetary base related model, augmented with Nigerian 
policy variable, is appropriately employed in testing the hypothesis in order to determine the 
degree of monetary policy independence loss by the five WAMZ countries that would 
eventually abandon their respective countries' currencies and join the monetary union. Instead 
of nominal interest rate, McCallum rule applies monetary base as a monetary policy 
instrument due to: (a) the ease of control of monetary base variable by the monetary 
                                                          
2
 Given the size of the economy of Nigeria, which is around 88% of the entire GDP of the WAMZ, this study 
consequently regards Nigeria as the potential anchor country for the proposed monetary zone; and for this 
reason, the evaluation of the nature of the reactions of monetary policies of other WAMZ economies to Nigeria's 
monetary policy was carried out. 
3
 There were counter opinions in the context of Eurozone creation, indicating that such view was as 'unreal'. 
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authority; and (b) the ambiguity in contracting or expanding the monetary policy stance when 
interest rate is the applied monetary policy tool.  
Because of the dominance of the Nigerian Naira within the proposed monetary zone, this test 
would check if the change in monetary base of other five members are driven by the change 
in the Nigerian monetary base. The determining logic is that the higher the degree of the 
influence of the Nigerian monetary base change on a WAMZ country's base money supply 
change, the lower the degree of loss of monetary autonomy on eventual formation of the 
second West African monetary union.  
1.3 Models Specifications 
Member countries of the WAMZ are developing/emerging economies. Due the 
underdevelopment of financial markets (money and capital markets) in the 
developing/emerging countries, it is common that the effect of interest rate on inflation as 
manifested in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms in these countries are very 
sluggish and should not have attracted much attention being offered by the TR. Furthermore, 
in these developing countries of inflation targeting, money aggregate may be playing more 
pronounced significant roles. For these reasons, monetary base aggregate is introduced here 
as a variable. This is a more appropriate alternative monetary reaction function for 
developing/emerging countries.4 This novel step deviate from many studies on monetary 
reactions analyses. The central point of this thinking is that the monetary base could better be 
manipulated to control inflation thus: 
  ∆𝑀𝑡 =  𝛼 - 𝑉𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡                                              1 
                                                          
4
 McCallum (1988)  
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Where ∆𝑀𝑡 is the growth rate of monetary base (𝑀1 ), and 𝑉𝑡is the monetary base velocity 𝛾 
is the parameter indicating how output deviation reach its target value with monetary base 
(which is the policy instrument in this case). If the equation (1) is adapted into the TR, it 
becomes the hybrid McCallum-Taylor rule (HMTR) modelled as: 
∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                      2 
In lending weight to the views of Goodhart and Hofman, (2002), because the decision making 
process of the policymaker depends on many economic indicators apart from output gap and 
deviations from inflation, there may be spurious and questionable estimation results if some 
relevant variables are omitted. Therefore, for developing open economies of the WAMZ 
countries, this study considers the inclusion of the deviations of annual percentage change of 
primary commodity price from its potentials, in the model of monetary policy rules for the 
WAMZ. In justifying the inclusion of the percentage change in commodity price in the 
monetary policy rule, it is more appropriate for a commodity exporting economy to take 
movements in commodity price index into cognisance. The reason for this is that such 
commodity price movements cause huge fluctuations in exchange rates and real economic 
activity. For inflation targeting open economies, the reaction function respond first to external 
disturbances, among a collection of extensive information. Thus the necessity for taking 
cognisance of the relevance of commodity exports in monetary policy. For the purposes of 
money supply growth rate smoothing and the associated inertia, the HTMR was augmented 
with one-period lagged growth rate of money supply. To this effect, the four variables of 
interest for the purpose of assessing the similarities in monetary reactions in the WAMZ in 
this novel contributions are the lagged money supply growth, growth rate of output gap, 
output gap, annual change of inflation deviation from its potentials and the growth rate of the 
deviation of the WAMZ country specific average commodity price from its potential.  
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Generally, policymakers make policy decisions based on the evaluation of future economic 
condition rather than contemporaneous condition, even as monetary policy is effective only 
with the incorporation of lags. TR is essentially ‘forward-looking’ if the CB as policymaker 
reacts to some expectations of inflation and output.  CBs are able to establish the 
incorporation of past or current economic condition and the significant inclusion of economic 
forecasts in their macroeconomic policy statements and some authors have asserted the 
consistency of forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions with observed behaviour 
of CBs.5  
In order to control for past effects and expectations of the growth rates of these variable, their 
one-period leads and lags were added to the right hand side of the model as independent 
variable. For the purposes of money supply growth rate smoothing and the associated inertia, 
the HTMR was augmented with one-period lagged growth rate of money supply. Time trend 
is introduced into account from the pattern of the shift in the equation function and to 
determine across the WAMZ countries, the relevance of time in the determination of the 
influence of independent variable as well as the degree of its impact on annual growth rate of 
money supply. Given these, applying the OLS estimation method, the model to estimate (with 
reflects the leads and lags of the four variables), is expressed as:   
∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑦𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡−1 +𝛾3𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝑦𝑔𝑡+1 +  𝛿2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝛿3𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝜃𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                              3 
where 𝑇 is the time trend. 𝛽1 is the parameter of the degree of ‘monetary policy inertia’; this, 
in addition to 𝛽2 , 𝛽3  and  𝛽4, are the parameters of interest for monetary reaction 
comparison across the WAMZ. 
                                                          
5 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Orhanides (1998)
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For expected loss of monetary independence, coming from the McCallum monetary base 
theoretical underpinnings, the equation that would reveal how the five smaller economies 
within the WAMZ (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) respond to 
changes in monetary base of the possible anchor economy, Nigeria reflecting the elongation 
on the right hand of the model with the Nigerian base money supply changes, is given as:  
∆𝑚𝑡 =  (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)𝑡 + (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)𝑡 +  ∆𝑚𝑡𝑁                              4 
Where (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)𝑡 is the output gap at time 𝑡, (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)𝑡 is the inflation deviation at 𝑡, ∆𝑚𝑡𝑁 
is the potential anchor monetary base growth rate (that is, monetary base of Nigeria) while ∆𝑚𝑡 is monetary base change in the five smaller WAMZ  countries at time 𝑡. There have 
been strong supports for lagged variables to be more appropriate in yield unbiased results, 
Consequent upon this, for the purpose of determining the expected loss of monetary 
independence by the five smaller WAMZ economies, the contemporaneous and backward-
looking monetary base models estimated are specified as: 
∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)𝑡 +  𝛽3∆𝑚𝑡𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡                        5 
and  
∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)𝑡−1 +  𝛾3∆𝑚𝑡−1𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡                        6 
In these models, for the purpose of meeting the research objectives here, the parameters of 
interest are 𝛽3 and 𝛾3 
1.4 Data and Methods 
Annual data of nominal GDP, inflation rate, money supply, and commodity price index were 
applied in this evaluation. These data cover the period 1980 to 2014. Nominal GDP and 
money supply data taken in the local currency units are expressed in logarithmic form. 
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Inflation rate is taken as the year-on-year changes in inflation calculated with the GDP 
deflator. The country-specific primary commodity prices employed in this work were 
constructed as the average of the prices of the top three exports primary commodities of each 
country; and the annual percentage change in the average commodity price were estimated 
and applied. In the calculation of the deviations from the potential, of nominal GDP, inflation 
rate and the country-specific commodity prices, the Hodrick-Prescot (with lambda (λ) =100 
for annual data) filter method was applied to filter the potential (trend) from the actual data. 
To ensure the stationarity of the variables used, the ADF unit root tests were carried out as 
the pre-estimation stage diagnosis. The OLS method was employed in estimating the 
monetary reactions coefficients for the countries under assessment and reactions of the 
monetary base changes in the five WAMZ countries to the Nigerian monetary base change 
(depicting the extent of loss of monetary independence by the five WAMZ countries). In 
order to ensure parameter stability and avoid biased, inefficient and spurious estimations, 
some post-estimation diagnostic tests were carried out and necessary adjustments made. The 
monetary policies of the six WAMZ member countries were modelled in line with the hybrid 
McCallum-Taylor Rule (HMTR) which is a modification of the popular Taylor Rule.  
1.5 Results and Findings 
In Table 1 below, we have the outcomes of the ADF unit roots tests on the variables 
employed in this section of the chapter. The results reveals that at 5% level of significance, 
inflation gap and commodity price gaps are stationary at their levels. For five WAMZ 
countries (excluding Nigeria), output gap is stationary, but made stationary for Nigeria at the 
second order differencing.  
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Table 1: Results of the ADF Unit Roots Tests  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply 
 (Level): 
 (1st Difference): 
 
-6.9600* 
 
 
-5.3255* 
 
 
-5.9122* 
 
 
-3.030** 
-7.5763* 
 
-3.3691** 
-8.1889* 
 
-5.4827* 
 
∆Nominal Output Gap 
 (Level): 
(1st Difference): 
  (2nd Difference): 
 
-6.4725* 
 
 
-5.6319* 
 
 
-3.8685* 
 
 
-5.3692* 
 
-2.5475 
-2.7687*** 
5.6281* 
 
-5.2661* 
 
∆Inflation Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-6.4505* 
 
-4.6722* 
 
-3.7486* 
 
-5.5274* 
 
-6.6187* 
 
-5.6038 
∆Commodity Price Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-6.6687* 
 
-6.3313* 
 
-6.2279* 
 
-6.3313* 
 
-6.1138* 
 
-6.3313* 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: For the unit roots tests *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively.  
 
The estimation of the augmented HMTR models exhibited in Table 2 below show that the 
leads and lags of output gap, inflation gap and commodity price gap are generally not 
statistically significant at 5% level. It is also apparent that apart from the statistical 
significance at 10% of commodity price gap, only in the case of Guinea, this variable is not 
significant in other cases. Due to these, these insignificant variables were deleted form the 
model of HMTR.  
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Table 2: Results of the Estimation of the Augmented HMTR Monetary Reactions  
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
∆Commodity Price Gap 
∆Output Gap(t-1) 
∆Inflation Gap(t-1) 
∆Comm. Price Gap(t-1) 
∆Output Gap(t+1) 
∆Inflation Gap(t+1) 
∆Comm. Price Gap(t+1) 
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
-0.2613 
0.9122* 
-0.9497 
0.0049 
0.2237 
-0.2462 
-0.0141 
-0.0207 
0.2300 
-0.0044 
0.0004 
 
0.88 
1.57 
13.7778 
(0.00) 
 
5.8675 
(0.05) 
 
3.1045 
(0.08) 
 
12.2058 
(0.35) 
 
0.0909 
(0.93) 
-0.2962*** 
-0.0006 
-0.3213* 
0.0890 
-0.0081 
-0.1690*** 
0.0969 
0.0699 
-0.1552 
0.0491 
0.0025 
 
0.57 
2.19 
2.4358 
(0.04) 
 
2.5983 
(0.27) 
 
3.9608 
(0.05) 
 
11.6859 
(0.39) 
 
1.1924 
(0.25) 
-0.7033** 
0.7538* 
-0.8478* 
0.0216*** 
0.4696 
-0.5078 
0.0147 
-0.2097 
0.1413 
0.0174*** 
-0.0009* 
 
0.88 
1.42 
9.6011 
(0.00) 
 
0.3791 
(0.83) 
 
3.3809 
(0.07) 
 
14.0756 
(0.23) 
 
1.4723 
(0.16) 
-0.4141*** 
0.0210 
0.5450 
-0.0309 
-0.1101 
0.6177 
-0.0812 
0.1561** 
-1.0753 
-0.1258 
-0.000 
 
0.47 
2.20 
1.5283 
(0.20) 
 
14.6123 
(0.00) 
 
1.3028 
(0.25) 
 
4.7036 
(0.94) 
 
0.3498 
(0.73) 
-0.3121 
-0.0689 
-0.0403 
-0.0624 
-0.0441 
-0.0122 
-0.0352 
0.0007 
-0.0050 
-0.0244 
-0.0009 
 
0.29 
2.07 
0.6717 
(0.75) 
 
0.0953 
(0.95) 
 
0.5218 
(0.47) 
 
8.2562 
(0.69) 
 
1.6656 
(0.11) 
0.4103*** 
0.8400* 
-0.9494* 
0.0517 
-0.2811 
0.3529 
0.0465 
-0.0263 
0.0661 
0.0561 
0.0015 
 
0.80 
1.83 
7.4914 
(0.00) 
 
0.7932 
(0.67) 
 
0.1796 
(0.67) 
 
12.5194 
(0.53) 
 
0.6867 
(0.50) 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Following the deletion of the insignificant variables from the earlier estimated model, in a 
consequential HMTR model estimated, the results in Table 3 below indicate that output gap 
coefficients are positive for all countries apart from the coefficient for Nigeria, while inflation 
gap coefficients reflect negative signs for all the WAMZ countries. The coefficients of 
determination (R2) measuring the goodness of fit of the model are low for in three countries. 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics testing serial correlation are reasonably good. However, 
the closeness to 2 of the DW statistics may be as a result of distortions brought about by the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variable (lagged money supply growth) in the model. The post-
estimation diagnostic tests however show that The Gambia, Ghana and Liberia failed the 
essential residual normality tests as revealed by the significance at 5% level of significance of 
J-B statistics and there is serial correlation in the case of Guinea. The functional form 
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Regression Error Specification Test (RESET) is significant at 5% level, only for Liberia, thus 
suggesting non-linearity of the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity checks were 
performed through the estimation of the variance inflation factors (VIF) which reveal some 
collinearity, following the standard in which a VIF of more than 4 calls for further analysis 
while a VIF of greater than 10 signals high level of collinearity.  
Table 3: HMTR Monetary Reactions Augmented (with money supply growth smoothing and time trend) 
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
∆Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
 
Variance Inflation Factors: 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
Output Gap 
Inflation Gap 
-0.0307 
0.9038* 
-0.9433* 
0.0002 
 
0.86 
2.15 
45.0620 
(0.00) 
 
6.5787 
(0.04) 
 
0.5115 
(0.47) 
 
7.7089 
(0.13) 
 
0.0054 
(0.94) 
 
 
1.928 
30.535 
33.937 
-0.1192 
0.0034 
-0.1928* 
0.0020** 
 
0.35 
1.77 
3.785 
(0.01) 
 
7.4332 
(0.02) 
 
0.0187 
(0.89) 
 
2.1732 
(0.70) 
 
0.0045 
(0.95) 
 
 
1.197 
1.161 
1.127 
-0.2442** 
0.9461* 
-1.0108* 
-0.0007 
 
0.80 
2.53 
22.6849 
(0.00) 
 
2.7208 
(0.26) 
 
3.4044 
(0.07) 
 
3.1987 
(0.53) 
 
1.7502 
(0.20) 
 
 
1.821 
40.977 
42.791 
0.3538*** 
0.0625 
-0.5109 
0.0057 
 
0.35 
2.06 
3.7344 
(0.01) 
 
7.8234 
(0.02) 
 
0.2122 
(0.65) 
 
3.8302 
(0.43) 
 
9.2321 
(0.00) 
 
 
1.795 
1.460 
1.117 
0.3878** 
-0.0423 
-0.0592 
0.0011 
 
0.31 
1.98 
3.0973 
(0.03) 
 
0.9882 
(0.61) 
 
0.6623 
(0.42) 
 
5.5550 
(0.23) 
 
0.4331 
(0.52) 
 
 
1.250 
3.238 
3.522 
0.1839** 
0.9025* 
-1.0128* 
0.0020 
 
0.75 
1.65 
21.2541 
(0.00) 
 
1.4346 
(0.49) 
 
1.4075 
(0.24) 
 
0.6275 
(0.96) 
 
1.2642 
(0.27) 
 
 
1.372 
29.998 
26.835 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
In proffering solution to problems detected by the post-estimation diagnostic tests, firstly, 
there were checks on the residual plots of The Gambia, Ghana and Liberia in efforts to attend 
to the related non-normality of the disturbance terms, which reveal some outliers. These 
outliers were removed and the model of monetary reaction was re-estimated, resulting in 
outcomes in Table 4 below.  
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Table 4: Adjusted HMTR Monetary Reactions Augmented  
(with monetary growth smoothing and time trend) 
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for Normality  
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
 
Variance Inflation Factors: 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
Output Gap 
Inflation Gap 
-0.0675 
0.9425* 
-0.9799* 
-0.001 
 
0.97 
1.61 
181.0444 
(0.00) 
 
0.3882 
(0.82) 
 
0.0916 
(0.76) 
 
4.1098 
(0.39) 
 
0.5678 
(0.46) 
 
 
1.1173 
13.5314 
13.1822 
-0.0799 
0.01552 
-0.2033* 
0.0009 
 
0.56 
1.51 
8.0833 
(0.00) 
 
5.2736 
(0.07) 
 
2.2842 
(0.13) 
 
2.4155 
(0.66) 
 
3.5085 
(0.07) 
 
 
1.6335 
1.2732 
1.3019 
-0.2442** 
0.9461* 
-1.0108* 
-0.0007 
 
0.80 
2.53 
22.6849 
(0.00) 
 
2.7208 
(0.26) 
 
3.4044 
(0.07) 
 
3.1987 
(0.53) 
 
1.7502 
(0.20) 
 
 
1.821 
40.977 
42.791 
0.5846* 
-0.0625* 
0.2250 
0.0018 
 
0.80 
1.02 
21.4489 
(0.00) 
 
0.3591 
(0.84) 
 
1.5853 
(0.21) 
 
4.4371 
(0.35) 
 
0.5207 
(0.48) 
 
 
7.5338 
6.4400 
1.5518 
0.3582** 
-0.0477 
0.0175 
0.0011 
 
0.33 
1.91 
3.3203 
(0.02) 
 
3.8664 
(0.14) 
 
0.1594 
(0.69) 
 
3.7520 
(0.44) 
 
0.6581 
(0.52) 
 
 
1.252 
1.360 
1.330 
0.1839** 
0.9025* 
-1.0128* 
0.0020 
 
0.75 
1.65 
21.2541 
(0.00) 
 
1.4346 
(0.49) 
 
1.4075 
(0.24) 
 
0.6275 
(0.96) 
 
1.2642 
(0.27) 
 
 
1.372 
29.998 
26.835 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 
 
The results fail to reveal similarities in monetary reactions across the WAMZ. The output gap 
reactions are negative for Liberia and Nigeria, while inflation gap coefficients are 
significantly negative for four WAMZ countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone); and for output gaps and inflation gaps, the magnitudes of reactions are significantly 
higher for The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. These depicts similarities just in three 
countries of the WAMZ. What these means is that holding inflation gap and the effects of 
past money supply constant, an increase by one unit of output gap, the change is expected to 
be positive in the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone (but negative in the case of 
Liberia and Nigeria). On the other hand, if inflation gap increases by one (holding the output 
gap and the money supply growth inertia constant), money supply growth would be positive 
for Liberia and Nigeria, and negative for The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
These changes would all be at the magnitude of the parameter coefficients yielded in Table 4 
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above. The low coefficients of time trends across all the WAMZ countries suggest that time 
is not important in the determination of the impact of output gap and inflation gap (including 
the effect of past money supply growth) on contemporaneous money supply growth. 
However, the statistical insignificance in these results are not overlooked as the implying 
level of confidence with which inferences are drawn here. 
The results of the diagnostic tests show tremendous improvement over this yielded by the 
earlier estimation. However, With the VIFs in 40s, 20s and 10s, The Gambia, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone still failed the multicollinearity tests evidencing high degree of inflation of the 
variances of the estimated coefficients of output gaps and inflation gaps as well as correlation 
between these two independent variables. Solving these problems at this level, the ‘centring’ 
solution was made in which the respective mean of output gaps and inflation gaps for these 
three countries were calculated and new variables of output gap and inflation gap generated 
as the deviation of the original value of these variables from the calculated mean value. These 
efforts yield no different results. 
Findings gathered from the monetary reaction analyses is that monetary reactions in the 
WAMZ are only significantly similar around The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (at 
similar magnitude) higher than those of the dissimilar results of the other three countries  
(Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria) where we can infer relationships with very low level of 
confidence. What this results suggests is that a single monetary policy may not be suitable for 
the future monetary zone, given the diverse forms of reaction of the monetary policy 
instrument to inflation and output, all things being equal and if past behaviour of the 
macroeconomic variables evaluated for the WAMZ countries are factors to reckon with. 
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Table: 5: Monetary Reactions to Anchor Country's (Nigerian) Monetary Base Change (1980-2014) 
Contemporaneous Augmented McCallum Monetary Base Model 
Dependent Variable: Change in Monetary Base 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Nigerian Monetary Base: 
 
 
Output Gap: 
 
 
Inflation Deviation: 
 
 
R2: 
F-probability: 
Observations: 
0.0004* 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0017 
(0.0021) 
 
0.49 
0.00 
34 
1.4473* 
(0.1253) 
 
-0.0216 
(0.1445) 
 
-3.4812 
(3.8976) 
 
0.83 
0.00 
34 
0.2221** 
(0.1067) 
 
1.6752 
(5.7172) 
 
14.642*** 
(8.3557) 
 
0.26 
0.09 
25 
0.0010* 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0162 
(0.0216) 
 
0.53 
0.00 
32 
0.1119* 
(0.0224) 
 
0.0895 
(0.2544) 
 
-0.4252 
(0.4131) 
 
0.54 
0.00 
34 
One-period Lagged Augmented McCallum Monetary Base Model 
Dependent Variable: Change in Monetary Base 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Nigerian Monetary Base: 
 
 
Output Gap: 
 
 
Inflation Deviation: 
 
 
R2: 
F-probability: 
Observations: 
0.0006* 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0020) 
 
0.55 
0.00 
33 
1.3888* 
(0.3725) 
 
-0.0168 
(0.2827) 
 
-6.7631 
(7.6524) 
 
0.37 
0.00 
33 
-0.2670 
(0.1782) 
 
-9.9120 
(6.1776) 
 
-2.871 
(8.8374) 
 
0.16 
0.30 
31 
0.0015* 
(0.0004) 
 
0.000 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0017 
(0.0266) 
 
0.42 
0.00 
31 
0.1547* 
(0.0372) 
 
0.1044 
(0.2770) 
 
-0.4712 
(0.4563) 
 
0.46 
0.00 
33 
Source: EIU and IMF databases, Author’s Estimations and Stata 14 Output. 
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 1% significant level, ** at 5% 
significance level and *** at 10% level of significance. 
 
Table 5 above shows the results of the estimations of the two augmented McCallum monetary 
base models for the WAMZ’s smaller economies over the period between 1980 and 2014.6 
Generally, in both estimations, the standard errors are low in the cases of The Gambia and 
Liberia while the coefficient of determination (R-Squared) is at the lowest in Guinea which 
also lacks joint significance at 5% and insignificant at this for. The results of interest are 
those yielded for the response of the monetary policy changes in these smaller economies to 
the anchor country’s (Nigerian) monetary policy changes which are significant at 1% and 
10% levels of significance. It could be observed from the results that while output gap and 
inflation deviation are statistically insignificant at 5% level of significance (except for 
                                                          
6
 Except for Guinea’s 1987-2014 period. 
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Guinea), the Nigerian policy stance mostly have positive  influence on monetary policies in 
all the five WAMZ countries. As expressed above, the degree of loss of monetary 
independence is low when the extent of the influence of Nigerian monetary base change is 
high.  
From the contemporaneous McCallum model results Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone 
demonstrated the lowest degree of expected loss of monetary autonomy since the Nigerian 
policy influence is higher in these two countries (though at low magnitude). For Guinea, the 
joint significance is at 0.09 while the coefficient of determination (R2) stands at the lowest of 
0.26, casting doubt over the ability of the Nigerian monetary policy instrument to explain the 
Guinea monetary policy stance. On the other hand, The Gambia has the comparatively 
highest measure of expected loss of monetary policy autonomy, followed by Liberia.  
The results of the estimated lagged augmented McCallum model again reveal Ghana, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone as exhibiting low degree of expected loss of monetary independence. 
Interestingly, this results reveal that at the negative coefficient of -0.2670 (not significant), 
the Guinean monetary policy was not influenced by the Nigerian policy. Again, the ability of 
the independent variables to explain the variations in the Guinean case is minimal at a very 
low R2 coefficient of 0.16 and F-probability of 0.30. The Gambia and Liberia, again display 
the higher degree of expected monetary independence loss, given their lower coefficient of 
the influence of the change in the Nigerian monetary base as policy instrument. Owing to the 
developing nature of African economies and the slow reactions of macroeconomic variables 
in the developing nations, greater emphasis are placed on results generated through the 
estimation of the lagged McCallum monetary base growth model for these WAMZ countries. 
 
 
18 
 
1.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper evaluates monetary reactions in the West African Monetary Zone focusing on 
their similarities of monetary reactions among member countries as well as the degree of 
expected loss of monetary independence by these countries on the eventual take-off of the 
proposed monetary integration. The research questions answered are in the directions of if 
there are monetary reactions similarities in the WAMZ; and on what the degree of expected 
loss (indirectly to Nigeria, a possible lead country) of monetary independence level of 
monetary independence by the other five WAMZ countries are. The modelling of monetary 
policies and monetary reactions of the six WAMZ member countries in this paper are 
according to the hybrid McCallum-Taylor Rule (HMTR), a modification of the popular 
Taylor Rule and the McCallum monetary base theoretical underpinnings. 
The results of the monetary reaction homogeneities assessments reveal evidence to suggest 
that all things being equal and if past behaviour of the macroeconomic variables evaluated for 
the WAMZ countries are factors of significance, a single monetary policy may not be suitable 
for the future monetary zone. The main proof here are the diverse forms of reactions of the 
monetary policy instrument to inflation and output. Evidence from the evaluation of the 
extent of expected loss of monetary independence by the WAMZ countries indicate that the 
degree of loss of monetary independence would be high in The Gambia and Liberia, the 
extent of this loss would be low in the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone.  
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